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Climate change briefing papers 
for ACCA members
Increasingly, ACCA members need to understand how 
the climate change crisis will affect businesses. This 
impact can be felt throughout an organisation as a 
consequence of changing taxation, carbon trading, 
new reporting requirements, different management 
needs, formulating adaptation policies, or changes 
required in governance.
The ACCA climate change briefing papers provide 
readers with the information needed to assess the 
changing environment ahead. ACCA has worked with 
several well-established partners in the relevant field 
to develop their content.
ACCA climate change briefing papers include the 
following titles:
1. adaptation
2. governance and management 
3. investment
4. mitigation
5. taxation.
www.accaglobal.com/climatechange
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Taxation: A UK Perspective by Professor Paul Ekins
There is evidence to suggest that a 
significant increase in carbon tax rate would 
only be politically feasible if it were 
implemented on a broadly revenue-neutral 
basis. 
 
There are strong arguments to underpin the 
young and embryonic trading schemes with 
a carbon tax 
 
Carbon or energy taxes also provide an 
essential foundation on which other policy 
instruments can build.
The UK government has now legislated statutory carbon 
budgets in three five-year periods to 2022, in pursuit of an 
overall legal commitment to an 80% reduction by 2050. 
These carbon budgets, which envisage a minimum 34% 
reduction in greenhouse gas emissions by 2020 (29% 
reduction in carbon dioxide emissions) are challenging. 
The question arises as to how they might best be met.
The Stern Review: The Economics of Climate Change (2007) 
identified three broad ways to reduce carbon emissions, all 
of which would have to be used by policy if stringent 
reductions in emissions were to be achieved: carbon 
pricing, the stimulation of low-carbon technological 
change, and the stimulation of behaviour change. This 
article focuses on carbon pricing, and particularly on 
carbon taxation, not least because carbon pricing is the 
only policy approach that hits all three of Stern’s policy 
buttons: by putting a price on carbon, low-carbon 
innovation becomes financially more attractive and will 
thereby be stimulated; and high-carbon behaviour 
becomes relatively less affordable, which will encourage 
low-carbon alternative behaviours.
The relation between carbon taxation and carbon 
emissions trading (the two principal means of carbon 
pricing) is discussed further below. Staying with carbon 
taxation for the moment, it is clear that this is not a 
politically comfortable option. In fact, there is evidence to 
suggest that a significant increase in carbon tax rate would 
only be politically feasible if it were implemented on a 
broadly revenue-neutral basis, meaning that it is carried 
out explicitly as an exercise to shift the burden of taxation, 
from ‘goods’ such as labour, wages and profits, to ‘bads’ 
such as pollution and resource depletion, rather than to 
increase it overall. Opinion polls generally show public 
support for such a ‘green tax shift’. For example, in the poll 
carried out prior to the launch of the UK Green Fiscal 
Commission1 in November 2007, 77% of those polled 
expressed support for a tax shift of this kind. The rub 
comes from the fact that this fell to 48% support for taxes 
on petrol or home energy use, with 35% opposed, a level 
of opposition that makes such taxes politically 
problematic. Without them, however, there can be no 
substantial tax shift.
1.  See www.greenfiscalcommission.org.uk
2Looking to the future, the argument is sometimes made 
that the policy scene has shifted, that emissions trading 
has now become the economic policy instrument of choice 
for the environment in those sectors that are most 
responsive to price, and that environmental impacts in 
other sectors are best dealt with by other policy 
instruments, such as regulation, voluntary agreements, 
information or public spending. I believe these arguments 
to be wrong.
First, for those sectors covered by emissions trading, there 
are strong arguments to underpin the young and 
embryonic trading schemes (the EU Emission Trading 
System (ETS) and the UK Carbon Reduction Commitment 
for large organisations) with a carbon tax. One reason is to 
provide a floor for the carbon price and, therefore, some 
safeguard for investors against the kind of excessive 
volatility exhibited in Phases 1 and 2 of the EU ETS. The 
other is that it would tax away some of the windfall gains 
that have been associated with the grandfathering of EU 
ETS permits, and allow other taxes to be lowered, i.e. it 
would give scope for a tax shift. As more permits were 
auctioned, as envisioned in the European Commission’s 
proposals for Phase 3 of the EU ETS, the effect of a 
European carbon tax in parallel with the EU ETS would not 
be to increase the price of carbon, because this price 
would be set by the quantity of emissions permits in the 
EU ETS. Rather, it would divide the price of carbon 
between the carbon tax and the permit price: the higher 
the carbon tax, the lower would be the price of permits. 
Once auctioning reached 100% of permits, of course, there 
would be no need for both instruments, but an escalating 
carbon tax would be a very good way of preparing the 
market for this desirable state of affairs.
Similarly with the Carbon Reduction Commitment (which 
is already paralleled by the Climate Change Levy), raising 
the CCL steadily over time would not increase the overall 
price of carbon, but reduce the price of the CRC permits, 
while providing revenue to government to allow other taxes 
to be reduced.
In a fiscal context such as the present (2009), the idea of 
revenue neutrality may need to be reinterpreted. Few 
people in the UK do not think that taxes will need to rise 
for some time into the future to plug the gap in the UK 
public finances that has opened up as a result of the 
economic recession and the fiscal stimulus measures that 
were put in place to attempt to limit its impact. The 
question is, what taxes should be increased? If they were 
carbon taxes, and if they were clearly introduced instead 
of other taxes (such as income taxes or National Insurance 
contributions), and if thereby the proportion of tax 
revenues from environmental taxes were to be increased, 
would this count as a tax shift, and would it command the 
public support that a tax shift in a revenue-neutral context 
might be expected to do (especially where the need to 
reduce carbon emissions was strongly accepted, which 
may not yet be the case)? We can be sure that the Treasury 
is pondering this question very seriously.
Political commitment to a tax shift would not be a new 
political phenomenon in the UK. In 1997 the new Labour 
government committed itself to a green tax shift with a 
forthright Statement of Intent on Environmental Taxation, 
and for some years pursued this intent with vigour, in its 
first term of office bringing in the Climate Change Levy 
(CCL) (actually a quasi-carbon tax, based on energy use 
but with a higher rate for electricity, which is more carbon-
intensive, than for natural gas) and the Aggregates Levy. 
These both had a revenue-neutral basis whereby their 
revenues were matched with reductions in employers’ 
National Insurance Contributions. Even so, the unremitting 
hostility of business to the CCL and the oil price increases 
and fuel tax protests of 2000, allied to lack of cross-party 
consensus on the need for environmental taxes (the 
Conservatives, having introduced the fuel duty escalator in 
1993, denounced it in 2000), caused new Labour 
effectively to abandon this agenda. By 2006 environmental 
tax revenues (the great majority of which are energy-
based) were lower than in 2000, and as a share of taxation 
had fallen to 7.3%, substantially lower than the 9.1% they 
accounted for in 1993, before green taxes featured at all 
on most national mainstream policy agendas.
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Tax Adjustments (BTAs) that have been advocated by 
President Sarkozy, and which were mooted as a possibility 
by the European Commission in its most recent proposals 
on how Europe should seek to reach its climate change 
objectives. Both policy approaches should be developed in 
parallel. The UK has much to contribute in this context, 
with its own relevant experience of the Climate Change 
Agreements (CCAs) associated with the CCL, and BTAs 
should be used to deter countries or sectors that might be 
disinclined to join global carbon reduction efforts but that 
may instead attempt to take a free ride on the efforts of 
everyone else.
The second argument against such taxes is their possible 
effects on low-income people and households. In fact, 
these effects only arise because of the still deplorable 
nature of much of the UK building stock (arguments about 
fuel poverty are unknown in those North European 
countries that have already invested in energy-efficient 
buildings), and this is something which needs to be 
comprehensively addressed if the UK is to have any 
chance of moving to a low-carbon economy, irrespective of 
other arguments. There are a whole range of institutional 
and financial innovations that could be brought into play to 
accelerate greatly the pace of change of improvement of 
UK household energy efficiency, starting with the homes 
currently lived in by poor people. A rising tax on the 
household use of energy would give a signal to everyone 
else that the longer they waited before making their homes 
energy efficient, the worse off they would be, and a one-
stop energy-efficiency advice service (already largely in 
existence) should then be available to tell them what to do.
The third argument sometimes levied against 
environmental taxes, especially by the Treasury, is that 
they cannot be taken seriously as sources of revenue 
because, if successful at changing behaviour, they destroy 
their revenue base. Doubtless there are some 
environmental taxes of which this is true (the Irish plastic 
bag tax springs to mind, although even here, despite 
having reduced plastic bag use by 90%, the 10% residual 
is still a large number, and the rate at which the tax is now 
levied means that revenues from the tax are not 
insubstantial). Nonetheless, there are also environmental 
taxes, such as fuel duty, of which it clearly is not. 
Carbon or energy taxes also provide an essential 
foundation on which other policy instruments can build. 
History shows that human ingenuity in finding new uses 
for energy is almost limitless. All energy sources have 
some environmental impacts, so that some tax on energy 
use is always justified on environmental grounds to 
encourage efficient use and to curb such new uses as, for 
example, patio heaters (where the tax, if desired, could be 
levied on the product rather than the energy use), which 
seem a particularly inappropriate innovation in a society 
trying to get to grips with greenhouse gas emissions and 
climate change.
Thanks to the policy innovation in the UK in recent years, 
especially in respect of energy use, there is now quite a 
diversified, environmentally differentiated tax base on 
which to build. Greatly increasing the Vehicle Excise Duty 
on low-mile-per-gallon motor cars could send a powerful 
signal about running costs at the point of vehicle purchase, 
which could of course be reinforced by substantial 
purchase taxes for these vehicles, as are in place in a 
number of European countries. Higher household energy 
taxes would increase the information value, and the 
advertised financial savings, from the energy labels that 
are now shown on many new white goods. They would also 
reinforce the message, which still seems so difficult to get 
across, that many household energy efficiency measures 
actually save money over reasonable time scales.
Three arguments are routinely advanced for why it is either 
undesirable or impossible to use environmental taxes to 
achieve behaviour change or reinforce other policy 
instruments to the desired extent. 
The first is their possible effect on competitiveness. In fact, 
this is a problem that arises for relatively few economic 
sectors: those that are both energy-intensive and exposed 
to intense international competition. The right policy 
approach here is not, because of these few sectors, to back 
off from environmental taxation for everyone else, but to 
put in place measures that will mitigate the 
competitiveness effects in those sectors that are 
particularly vulnerable. In fact, two policy approaches are 
currently under discussion in this regard: the global 
sectoral agreements, that are on the table in the context of 
the post-Bali climate change negotiations; and the Border 
4Revenues are the product of two factors: the tax rate and 
the quantity of consumption of the taxed product. As 
increases in the former change the price, the quantity 
consumed will fall in accordance with what economists call 
the price elasticity: the proportional reduction in 
consumption compared with the price change. If the 
elasticity in respect of the price is minus one, then a 
certain increase in the tax rate that increases the price by 
some proportion will reduce consumption by the same 
proportion, and revenues from the tax will be at least 
maintained. It is well established that, for most energy use 
and transport, price elasticities are between zero and 
minus one – meaning that an increase in the tax rate will 
change behaviour to some extent, and result in increased 
revenues. If part of a tax shift, this might be termed a 
win-win-win outcome for society (which gets less pollution 
and climate change, and fewer other environmental 
‘bads’), for non-polluting taxpayers (who get reductions in 
other taxes), and for the Treasury, which is able to 
rebalance the tax base away from labour and firms, which 
are becoming more difficult to tax.
It might be argued that by, say, 2050, if 80% reductions in 
carbon emissions have taken place, revenues from a 
carbon tax would inevitably be reduced. This is obviously a 
possible issue, but there are three counter considerations. 
The first is that the carbon price might be such by 2050 
that even 20% residual carbon emissions would yield 
substantial revenues; the second is that energy will remain 
an important input into the economy, so that revenues 
from energy taxes, to encourage energy efficiency, could 
still be substantial; the third is that 2050 is a long time 
away, by when it is likely that many other things relating to 
taxes and revenues will have changed, and speculations 
about that long-distant date should not inhibit policy 
makers from doing sensible things now.
The limited green fiscal reforms that have so far been 
implemented in six north European countries, including 
the UK, have been positively evaluated for both their 
environmental and economic effects. Systematic 
implementation of such reform through escalators – 
modest annual percentage increases in resource taxes and 
pollution charges – would give people and businesses time 
to adjust, but over time would transform the economy. It is 
not clear that the dramatic reductions in greenhouse gas 
emissions now being sought, and which the government is 
legally obliged to achieve, can be achieved in any other 
way. 
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